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SCHOOL TORT LIABILITY
There exists today in the courts of this nation an increasingly
more sympathetic attitude toward those who are injured at the
hand of another Exemplary of this trend is the field of products
liability Much progress has been made since MacPherson v
Buick Motor Co.' Also thriving in these same courts is a rule of
vague origin which is hostile to the interests of injured parties.
This rule, which even denies recovery when gross and wanton
negligence is present, is recognized as being anachronistic, unjusti-
fiable, irrational and repugnant to basic principles of justice, its
only salvation being the force of stare decisis.2  The rule is
embodied in the doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort liability.
Although recognized as one of the most criticized rules of torts,
it has withstood attack in the most sympathy evoking situations s
and even in the face of statutes abrogating it.4
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
Although the courts reviewing the history of the doctrine do not
consider or explain the genesis of the doctrine in their particular
jurisdiction-most merely accepting it as something that just hap-
pened and citing the long history of its existence in their case
law 5-some basic facts of its origin are recognized. Recognized
as the primary origin of the doctrine is the concept "The King can
do no wrong."6  That this cannot be accepted is demonstrated
1. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See 42 N.D.L. RIv. 53 (1965).
2. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 fl.2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) , Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr.
89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
3. See, Koehn v. Board of Educ., 193 Kan. 263, 392 P.2d 949 (1964) (child became
paraplegic as a result of injury received on playground) DaszkIewicz v. Board of Elauc.,
301 Mich. 212, 3 N.W.2d 71 (1942) (death from fall down elevator shaft in school build-
ing).
4. Compare Graham v. Worthington, 146 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 1966), with Boyer v. Iowa
High School Athletic Ass'n., 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964) and IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 25A (Supp. 1966).
5. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962)
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
6. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Cornm'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963), Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., aupra note 2.
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by the observation of one justice that this theory died in 1215 at
Runnymede.7 The progenitor of the doctrine is the early English
case of Russell v Men of Devon,8 the first application thereof m
the United States coming in the 1812 Massachusetts case of Mower
v Lezcester I
Interestingly some surrounding facts indicate that Russell is
poor authority for the doctrine, if it is authority at all. Russell
concerned an action against all the men of an unincorporated entity,
and has been cited in an American jurisdiction as authority for
imposing liability on an incorporated county 10 Russell was decided
in 1788, twelve years after our Declaration of Independence, hardly
early enough to make it a part of our Common Law Finally, in
1890 the British courts overruled the Russell case and imposed tort
liability on its schools, 1 a position maintained to the present day
THE GENERAL RULE
The overwhelmingly recognized general rule regarding school
tort liability today is that the schools are quasi-corporations created
as an agency of the state to execute the purely governmental function
of providing a free and public education for the residents of the
state. As such they are imbued with the state's immunity from
tort liability in the absence of a clear statute imposing such
liability 12
This rule is variously stated in different states, depending on
the structural organization of the state, with the school being referred
to as the school board in some cases and being characterized at
times merely as an agency of the state's or as a political sub-
division of the state.
1
4
It appears that the reason for giving the school a characteri-
zation different from that of municipalities or counties is to avoid
the possibility of applying the spurious distinctons created to im-
pose liability on the latter two types of subdivisions.
Despite the observation by the California Supreme Court, in
discussing the doctrine, that "None of the reasons for its continu-
ance can withstand analysis. No one defends total governmental
7. Richards v. School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643, 655 (1957) (dissent).
8. 2 T.R, 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). See also Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,
suPra note 2 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School Dist. No. 302, supra note 2.
9. 9 Mass. 247 (1812) (cited in Holytz, supra note 5).
10. Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 284 (1871) (cited in Spanel, supra note 5).
11. Crisp v. Thomas, 63 L.T.N.S. 756 (1890) (cited In Molitor, supra note 2).
12. E.g., School Dist. No. 48 V. Rivera, 93 Ariz. 384, 243 Pac. 609 (1926), overrulcd,
Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., aupra note 6, Dahl v. Hughes, 347 P.2d 208 (Okla.
1959) Ford v. School Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 15 At]. 812 (1888) Jensen v. Juul, 66 S.D. 1,
278 N.W 6 (1938) , Bingham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950).
13. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959) Mire v. Lafourche Parish
School Bd., 62 So.2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
14. Graham v. Worthington, supra note 4.
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immunity "I" There do exist many bases on which the doctrine
is supported in protecting schools and continuing the existence of
the doctrine.
Perhaps the most forceful and easiest to defend of all the
rationales is that of stare decisis. Notwithstanding the repeated
assertions that stare decisis is not a rigid standard which prevents
courts from correcting their own errors,16 "[tlhe legal ghost of
that doctrine"17 still comes forth to prevent compensation of those
injured by the state in one of its many forms. 8
Another frequently cited basis for the rule is based on some
conclusion founded in a statutory or constitutional provision. This
takes many forms: the school is an agency of the state created
to perform only a governmental function19 (extant primarily where
the governmental-proprietary distinction has been pleaded), the
school funds cannot be used to satisfy judgments, 20 no authority
exists to raise money for the purpose of paying judgments, 21 the
school would go bankrupt if it had to pay such claims, 22 and other
reasons based on the precarious fiscal status of the school 22 school
board has no authority to commit a tort, 24 and the school has
authority to perform only those functions required by statute. 25
While it is immediately apparent that these arguments retain some
of their validity today, it is submitted that they ignore the avail-
ability of liability insurance to cover such expenses.
Support has also been found in the concept that it is more
reasonable that individuals bear the cost of their injury than that
the school be imposed upon to respond for the injury it has caused
by its negligence. 2 The absurdity of this position is best demon-
strated by citing as examples some of the injuries which the mdi-
vidual has been forced to bear without recompense: a child injured
in the eye by negligently maintained fence, resulting in total loss
of sight; 27 a student severely injured as a result of a negligently
15. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr 89, 359 P.2d 457, 460
(1961).
16. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., supra note 6 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa
Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957), Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d
1 (1961) (opinion for reversal).
17. Richards v. School Dist, supra note 7.
18. E.g., Perkins v. Trask, 23 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1933), Dahl v. Hughes, supra note 12
Conway v. Humbert, 145 N.W.2d 524 (S.D. 1966).
19. School Dist. No. 48 v. Rivera, supra note 12.
20: Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
21. Hummer v. School City, 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E.2d 891 (1953).
22. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, supra note 20.
23. Hummer v. School City, supra note 21 Rhoades v. School Dist. No. 9, 115 Mont.
352, 142 P.2d 890 (1943).
24. School Dist. No. 48 v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 Pac. 609 (1926), ovcrruled, Stone
V. Arizona Highway Comm'n. 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
25. See, Ford v. School Dist., 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atl. 812 (1888), Bingham v. Board of
Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432 (1950).
26. See, Thacker v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 301 Ky. 781, 193 S.W.2d 409 (Ct App.
1946) , Ford v. School Dist., supra note 25 Anderson v. Board of Bduc., 49 N.D. 181, 190
N.W 807 (1922).
27. Shields v. School Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 184 A.2d 240 (1962).
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operated athletic program, becoming ultimately a paraplegi;28
deaths from drowning and other causes;2 9 and loss of limbs.A0
Finally, recovery has been denied on the theory that the doctrine
of respondeat superior does not apply to schools, 31 consequently,
the agent of the school had no authority to bind the school by acting
tortLously and his acts could not bind the school. By refusing to
apply vicarious liability to the schools, the courts disregard com-
pletely that the school can act only through the use of agents, and
places them in the enviable position of being able to avoid the
undesireable consequences of the conduct of those given authority
to act on behalf of the school.
EXCEPTIONS
As must ultimately result when a doctrine as unjust as the
governmental immunity doctrine is imposed upon the courts, excep-
tions have been developed to thwart, to some extent, the harshness
of the doctrine. Notwithstanding that some courts have held the
school to be absolutely immune,3 2 even to the extent that they
cannot waive their own immunity,13 the exceptions have been applied
to schools. Although the usual course followed in creating an excep-
tion is the recognition of two types of conduct, one of which will
result in the imposition of liability, there are some means of cir-
cumventing the doctrine not dependent upon such a cumbersome
process. One of these is that recognized by the general rule-passage
of a special act waiving immunity in a particular case.3 4 This
process is obviously slow and cumbersome because of the necessity
of waiting until the legislature convenes and depending upon the
legislative process to approve the act. An additional deterrent to
this means of relief is that it depends upon some circumstance of
sufficient compulsion to arouse the sympathy of the legislature.
Another means created by the courts to avoid the harshness
of the rule is characterizing the conduct as a nuisance.3 5 This gambit
is infrequently applied and is held not applicable to schools.38 Other
ways utilized by courts are the imposition of liability if reasonable
28. Koehn v. Board of Educ., 193 Kan. 263, 392 P.2d 949 (1964), Vendrell v. School
Dist. No. 26C, 226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1960).
29. Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D. 1965) Anderson v. Board of
Educ., supra note 26, Jensen v. Juul, 66 S.D. 1, 278 N.W 6 (1938).
30. Bragg v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 160 Fla. 590, 36 So.2d 222 (1948).
31. Rhoades V. School Dist. No. 9, aupra note 23.
32. Koehn v. Board of Educ., supra note 28 Hummer v. School City, 124 Ind. App. 30,
112 N.E.2d 891 (1953) Richards v. School Dist, 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1947).
33. Kellam v. School Bd., 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960), Utz v. Board of Educ.,
30 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1944).
34. E.g., Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 834, 155 S.W.2d 469 ,Ct. App. 1941) , Steer
v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 92 So.2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 1957) Whitfield v. East Baton
Rouge Parish School Bd., 43 So.2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
35. See Anderson v. Board of Educ., supra note 26.
36. Blngham v. Board of Educ., 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 422 (1950) Kellam v. School
Bd., supra note 33.
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men would not permit the continuance of the "palpably and mani-
festly dangerous condition, ' 13 7 and finding the action to be based
on contract and not tort.88 One other exception, limited to the
application of the immunity when the officer is deemed to be acting
in his discretionary capacity, is to impose liability when the officer
is deemed to be motivated by malice. 9
The most frequently recognized distinction applied to impose
liability is that of governmental-proprietary 40 The court will impose
liability if the function involved is deemed to be proprietary in
nature.4 1 The test to determine whether the function is proprietary
has been stated to be whether the act is for the common good
of all without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary
profit,' 2 an affirmative answer resulting in a determination that
the function is governmental. Conversely it has been stated that
the criteria for a proprietary function are that the conduct is not
required by statute, or if it may be carried on by private enter-
prise or if it is used as a means of raising money 43 It is of little
wonder that this distinction has produced "a quagmire that has
long plagued the law"" and has resulted in contradictory results
in dealing with the same subject matter in different jurisdictions.45
As one court observed, this distinction is generally "applied to
escape difficulties, in order that injustice may not result from the
recognition of technical defenses. 146
Other distinctions occasionally recognized and seldom applied
are acts of omission-commission 4  and exercise of ministerial-
judicial authority," liability being imposed when an act of com-
mission or an exercise of ministerial authority is negligently exe-
cuted. It is not wholly unexpected that the latter two distinctions
have met with less acceptance than the governmental-proprietary
dichotomy when problems of definition are noted and considered.
Few positions, if any, have the absolute absence of discretion
37. Davis v. City of Henryetta, 402 P.2d 902 (Okla. 1965).
38. Buttes v. County of Dade, 178 So.2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
39. Eliason v. Funk, 233 Md. 351, 196 A.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1964). But see, Parker v.
City of Hutchinson, 196 Kan. 148, 410 P.2d 347 (1966) (Comment, 43 N.D.L. R rv. 118
(1966) applying immunity even though the conduct was .grossly and wantonly negligent).
40. See, e.g., Sawaya v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, 78 Ariz. 389, 281 P.2d 105
(1955) Boyer V. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n., 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964)
Dahl V. Hughes, 347 P.2d 208 (Okla. 1959) Morris v. School Dist, 393 Pa. 633, 144 A.2d
737 (1958). Contra, Ludwig v. Board of Educ. 35 Ii1. App.2d 401, 183 N.E.2d 32 (1962)
(governmental-proprietary distinction not applicable to schools).
41. Morris v. School Dist., supra note 40.
42. Daszkiewics v. Board of Educ., 301 Mich. 212, 3 N.W.2d 71 (1942).
43. Morris v. School Dist., supra note 40.
44. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
45. Compare Sawaya v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, supra note 40, with Kellam
v. School Bd., supra note 33.
46. Bucholz v. City of Sioux Falls, 91 N.W.2d 606, 609 (S.D. 1958).
47. See Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966) McAndrew v. Mularchuk, i3
N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) Holtz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962).
48. Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hosp., 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168 (1963).
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requisite to a determination that a ministerial duty was exercised.
It is also difficult to find that inaction was not actually a form
of action. It is evident that none of these exceptions is imbued
with such certainty that it should be a basis for denying recovery
to an individual who has suffered at the hands of the state and will
be forced to suffer his pain without the compensation permitted
when the same activity is performed by a private person. One
other distinction recognized in a 1963 Minnesota case, probably re-
sulting from the prospective abrogation of the doctrine by the state's
court in 1962, was that a statute which required the conduct which
was not performed and caused the death was sui generis and,
therefore, justified an exception to the immunity rule.
4 9
ABROGATION
The criticism of the rule has not gone unheeded for the gov-
ernmental immunity doctrine has been revoked in many states by
the courts and the legislatures. What was recognized at the be-
ginning of this decade as a trend, 50 based largely on four cases,
has increased in tempo to the point that it appears quite likely
that state liability may be the general rule before the end of this
decade.
A. By Decision
The first case in which the doctrine was abrogated by the courts
was a 1957 decision in Florida.5 1 In that case the Florida Supreme
Court recognized that the doctrine was anachronistic, that it violated
the traditional concept that a personn injured should have redress,
and that the traditional justifications for the rule were indefensible.
A subsequent Florida case, however, limited the application of the
abrogation to municipalities.
52
The courts of Colorado, 53 Michigan, 54 and Wisconsin 5 5 reversed
their precedents on the doctrine shortly after the Florida decision
but each of these has also met with some limitation. The Colorado
decision was subsequently held to apply only to obligations arising
out of contract,56 notwithstanding the statement in the decision
abrogating the doctrine that "In Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may
be a proper subject for discussion by students of mythology but
49. McCorkell v. City of Northfield, 266 Minn. 267, 123 N.W.2d 367 (1963).
50. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) (opinion for
reversal).
51. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
52. Buck v. McLean, 115 So.2d 764 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
53. Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582
(1957).
54. Williams v. City of Detroit, 8upra note 50.
55. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 47.
56. City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826 (1960).
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finds no haven or refuge in this Court." 57 Also, in the Michigan
decision the court stated unequivocally that the defense of govern-
mental immunity would no longer exist in that state, but laer
decisions limited the abrogation to cities. 58 The Wisconsin court
placed its own limitation on the operation of its decision by holding
that, while they were removing the state's nonliability for torts,
they were not affecting its sovereign right not to be sued. In all of
these cases the court recognized that the courts had created the
immunity and that they had the power to extinguish it.
The courts of Arizona, 59  California, 0  Illinois,6
1  Minnesota,62
and Nevada 3 also judicially abolished the doctrine, but without
subsequent cases limiting the effect. Arizona is the only one of
these, however, which was not affected by legislative action. The
operation of the California decision was suspended by statute for
two years,6 4 subsequently being embodied in a section of a com-
prehensive statutory scheme of tort liability 65 The Minnesota de-
cision was suspended by the opinion itself until after the 1963 session
of the legislature, and the Illinois decision was altered by legislative
action the same year 66 Although the Nevada court held that school
districts did not enjoy the same immunity as the state, it is notable
that the decision involved an injury incurred only four months before
the Nevada statute abrogating immunity was to become effective
and was decided after the operational date.
B. By Statute
Comprehensive tort liability statutes now exist in Alaska, 67 Cali-
fornia, 6 8 Hawaii, 69  Illinois, 70  Iowa,' 1 Minnesota, 72 Nevada,73  New
57. Colorado Racing Comm'n. v. Brush Racing Ass'n., supra note 53, at 316 P.2d 585.
58, McDowell v. Mackie, 365 Mich. 268, 112. N.W.2d 491 (1961).
59. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
60. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
61. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ili.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959).
62. Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
63. Walsh v. Clark County School Dist., 419 P.2d 774 (Nev. 1966) (refers only to
school districts).
64. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1404, p. 3206 (expired 1963 by its own force). See Corning
Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325 (1962),
determining the effect of the statute.
65. CAL. GovT. CODE: §§ 815-825.6 (West Supp. 1966).
66. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34 § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd 1960) ch. 122 §§ 821, 825 & 830
(Smith-Hurd 1962), ch. 85 § 2-109 and ch. 105, § 12.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966). ill.
Laws 1959, ch. 57h, 3a, ch. 105, §§ 333.2a & 491.
67. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1962).
68. Supra note 65.
69. HAWAIi REV. LAws ch. 245A (Supp. 1963).
70. ILL. ANN. STAT. supra note 66.
71. IowA CODE ANN. ch. 25A (Supp. 1966).
72. MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 466 (1963). Note that section 466.12 (Supp. 1966) excepts
school districts from operations of the statute but provides that the section will expire
in 1970.
73. NEV. REV. STAT. 9H 41.031 to 41.038 (1966).
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York,14  Utah"5  and Washington.76  With the exception of New
York, which has had a tort claims provision since 1920, these
statutes are all products of this decade. Their provisions generally
provide for liability, tortious and otherwise, with exceptions m some
circumstances, e.g., execution of statutes, exercise-of discretionary
authority, etc. North Carolina has chosen not to eliminate their
immunity but instead created a commission to hear cases involving
claims against the state and award payments therefore to be paid
out of the state treasury " South Dakota has also created a board
for the purpose of hearing claims against the state but the board
is advisory only and reports its findings to the legislature.78 Other
states have chosen merely to permit schools to purchase liability
insurance,7 9 but in the absence of a provision in the statute waiving
immunity to the extent of the insurance, the purchase of insurance
has not always been effective to permit recoveries against the
insurer. 80
NORTH DAKOTA
In 1922 the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the doctrine
as a "well settled common law rule"8 ' and applied it to protect a
school from liability In 1965 the court again considered the doc-
trine,8 2 noting the cases in other jurisdictions abrogating the rule,
but felt constrained by the North Dakota Constitution s to uphold
the doctrine. In the 1967 session of the legislature a bill which would
have abrogated the doctrine was indefinitely postponed.84 The legis-
lature did provide some relief, however, in adopting a bill which
will permit the purchase of liability insurance and waives immunity
to the extent of such insurance. 5 Notably, the question of total
abrogation of the doctrine was referred to the Legislative Research
Committtee for study 9'
74. N.Y. CT. CM. Ac'T § 8 .(1963).
75. UTAH Conn ANN. title 63-30 (Supp. 1965).
76. WA8H. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 Supp. 1966). Note that section 28.58.030 creates
an exception for school districts when "athletic apparatus" Is involved but this has not
been a large restriction. See Tardiff v. Shoreline School .Dist., 66 Wash.2d 146, 411 P.2d
889 (1966) , Rodriguez v. Seattle Dist. No. 1, 66 Wash.2d 51, 401 P.2d 326 (1965).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. §J 143-291 to 300.1 (Supp. 1965).
78. S.D. CoDE § 33.43 (Supp 1960).
79. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. 3 160.310 (1962) W. VA. CoDE ANN. 18-5-13 (1961) ; Wyo.
STAT. ANN. .§§ 21-154 to 159 (1957).
,80. See Stevens V. City of St. Clair Shores, 366 Mich..341, 115 N.W.2d 69 (1962) (action
against insured school dismissed) Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33,
338 P.2d 808 (1959). Compare Christie v. Board of Regents, 364 Mich. 202, 111 N.W.2d
30 (1961) (to find insurance not waiver 'would give insurance company premiums without
liability), with Sayers v. School Dist. No. 1, 366 Mich. 217, 114 N.W.2d 191 (1962) (in-
surance not a waiver).
81. Anderson v. Board of Educ., 49 N.D. 181, 190, 190 N.W. 807, 811 (1922) (concur-
ring opinion).
82. Fetzer v. Minot Park Dist., 138 N.W.2d 601 (N.D 1965).
83. N.D. CONST. 11 22 & 130.
84. S. 256. 40th Legis. Sess. (1967).
86. S. 884, 40th Legls. Sess. (1967) (a bill to amend Code sections 39-01-08 & 40-43-07).
86. S. Con. Res. BEE, 40th Legis, Sess. (1967).
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Although the move toward state liability appears to be gaining
momentum, there are still those who would defend the need for
immunity They express concern that our already over-burdened
courts will become more so. The answer to this is that, although
this has not been the case in jurisdictions which have removed the
defense, S7 the need for change would be more apparent. There
can be less justification for a rule which creates a hardship for
so many people than one which is relatively innocuous. It may also
be contended that the state will be forced to pay for every injury
The courts and the statutes do not, however, impose such liability;
the state merely becomes liable the same as any individual. 8 All
the defenses available to those who employ agents in the per-
formance of their business-nonliability for the acts of its agents,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, etc.-are also available
to the state.
The provision adopted by the North Dakota Legislature, a laud-
able advancement, is not the ultimate solution and is, in fact, little
better than the recognized exceptions. With the purchase of in-
surance optional, theoretically, and very probably, situations will
arise in which one injured by negligence in a school conscientious
enough to purchase insurance, will be permitted redress, whereas
one injured in the same manner but in a school without insurance
will be denied relief. A comprehensive provision imposing liability
will avoid this problem, with care being taken to avoid the result
which was reached in Iowa. In 1966 the Iowa Legislature accepted
the responsibility handed it by its high court and abrogated the
Immunity,89 using language in a 1964 case to describe those sub-
divisions upon which liability would be imposed.90 Later that year
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a school district was not
included within the language of the statute,91 notwithstanding that
the terms were used by that court to describe a school district.
There can be no doubt but that the court is acting to undo that
which it placed upon the legislature.
Hopefully consideration will be given to the recognition that
If there is anything more than a sham to our constitutional
guarantee that the courts shall always be open to redress
wrongs and to our sense of justice that there shall be a
87. The Washington Statute, supra note 76, was first enacted in 1961 but it was ap-
parently not applied until 1965 in Evangelical United Bretheren Church v. State, 407 P.2d
440 (Wash. 1965).
88. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal. Itptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457
(1961).
89. Supra note 71.
90. Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n., 256 Iowa 337, 127 N.W.2d 606 (1964)
(school created as agency of state).
91. Graham v. Worthington, 146 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 1966) (school held not state
agency).
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remedy for every wrong committed, then certainly the
rule cannot be supported. 2
Since the North Dakota Constitution contains a similar provision
the reasoning should be equally applicable. Similarly the Illinois
court could have been speaking of the situation in North Dakota
when they stated
We -do not believe that in this present day and age, when
public education constitutes one of the biggest businesses in
the country, that school immunity can be justified. 93
A realistic evaluation of the extent to which the state, in all
of is multifarious forms, pervades -the lives of its citizens, and a
recognition of the plethora of possibilities for injury to one of those
citizens through the negligence of one of the state's agents, will
glaringly illustrate the profound need for imposing liability When
injuries do occur It cannot be ignored that attendance at schools
is compelled by statute in North Dakota to the age of sixteen,94
and by society at least to some degree of education beyond high
school, a factor which indicates a more pressing need for change
regarding schools than in other areas where the state can be
avoided.
ROBERT STROUP II
92. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 132 (Fla 1957).
93. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 I1.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 94
(1959),cert. dented, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34-01 (1960).

